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Abstract 
The concept of movable evidence masses that flow 
from supersets to subsets as specified by experts 
represents a suitable framework for reasoning 
under uncertainty. The mass flow is controlled by 
specialization matrices. New evidence is integrated 
into the frame of discernment by conditioning or 
revision (Dempster's rule of conditioning), for 
which special specialization matrices exist. Even 
some aspects of non-monotonic reasoning can be 
represented by certain specialization matrices. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we present a suitable theoretical model for 
handling uncertainty, which is an important problem in 
the range of knowledge based systems. Uncertainty corre­
sponds to the valuation of some datum, reflecting the faith 
or doubt in the respective source. So we have to deal with 
statements being not just simply true or false but with a 
validity which is a matter of degree. This is caused by the 
fact that the actual state of the world is not completely 
determined and we have to rely on a human experts sub­
jective preferences among different possibilities. 
Throughout this paper we will restrict ourselves to the 
treatment of subjective valuations of evidence which re­
quires the use of belief functions measuring the credibility 
of information although our concept of specialization is 
very general and can be applied to probabilities as well as 
possibility measures. 
Let n, a finite nonempty set be our frame of discernment. 
We assume n to be a product space QM !f nj X ... X nm 
with m characteristiCS JC.l! E Q1, ... , JC.m! E Qm where Q, 
(i = 1, . .. , m) is a finite nonempty set. The partial know­
ledge is encoded through evidence masses attached to 
subsets of n. Specialization matrices quantify the flow of 
masses, the concept we prefer to Dempster's rule of con­
ditioning (Shafer 1976). 
A mass distribution is considered here as the condensed 
representation of a (possibly unknown) random set, for 
other semantics see (Kruse, Schwecke and Heinsohn 
1991). 
Section 2 provides an overview about mass distributions 
and belief functions. In section 3 we present our main 
concept: the flow of evidence masses given by a speciali­
zation matrix (Kruse and Schwecke 1990). In section 4 
we consider specialization matrices which can be applied 
to conditioning and revision, and discuss certain aspects 
of non-monotonic reasoning. 
2 REPRESENTING KNOWLEDGE WITH 
MASS DISTRIBUTIONS 
Belief functions aim to model a human decision maker's 
subjective valuation of evidence. For this purpose we 
consider an inaccessible, finite probability space e of sen­
sors or experts and a sample space n containing the pos­
sible events. The sensors or experts choose subsets of n 
which they believe to contain the actual state of the 
world. This means we consider multivalued mappings 
defined on a probability space, here called random sets 
(Matheron 1975). With respect to the probability distribu­
tion on the sensor space e one unit of ''belief' which we 
conceive as movable "evidence mass" is distributed 
among the elements of n, attributing a greater amount to 
the more likely elements (the elements chosen by the 
most or most reliable sensors or experts). That means a 
mass distribution m (basic probability assignment (Shafer 
1976)) is specified, which is a mapping from 2° to the 
unit interval!. 
Definition 1: Each junction m : 2° � [0, 1) is called 
a mass distribution, whenever 
(i) m(0) = 0, 
(ii) L m(A) = 1 
A:Ac n 
hold. 
The mass m(A) is understood to be the measure of "be­
lief' that is committed exactly to A and corresponds to 
the support given to A but not to any strict subset of A. 
Those sets A with m(A) > 0 are called focal elements. To 
obtain the total measure of belief committed to some set 
A, we have to sum up the quantities m(B) for all B �A. 
Definition 2: If m is a mass distribution on 2°, then 
the function Belm : 2° -t [0, 1], 
Belm(A) 4 L m(B), 
B:Bo;:A 
is called the belief function induced by m. 
Bel .. ( A) represents the degree to which the actual evidence 
supports A, i.e. it measures the credibility of A. We are 
also able to calculate the degree to which the evidence 
fails to refute A, i.e. the degree to which A remains plau­
sible: 
d -PLm(A) = 1 - Belm(A) 
We have 
= 1 - L m(B) L m(B). 
a: Be. A B:An s�0 
Bel .. (A) <::; Pl .. (A), and 
Bel,.( A) + Bel .. ( A) <::; 1 
for all A� Q. 
To measure the evidence mass that can freely move to 
any element or subset of A we use the concept of commo­
nality junctions. Let m be a mass distribution defined on 
2°. l11e function 
Q .. (A) 4 L m(B) 
B:Ac. 8 
measures the evidence mass which is attached to supersets 
of A and can move to A or to any of its subsets. Obvio­
usly Q.,(A) = 0 indicates that there is no mass "above" 
A, i.e. A cannot receive more evidence mass from its 
supersets. 
To represent total ignorance about the domain under 
consideration, we set m(Q) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all A � 
Q and we obtain Bel.,(Q) = 1 and Bel.,( A) = 0 for all A 
� n. This belief function is called the vacuous belief 
function. On the other hand setting m({xJ) = p,, x, E n = 
{x1, • • •  , x,} and m(A) = 0 for all non-elementary sets A 
leads to a Bayesian belief junction or, in terms of the 
probability theory, a discrete probability distribution. We 
can imagine "belief' as partially movable evidence mass, 
where m( A) is that amount of mass which can, in the light 
of new information, move to every subset of A but not to 
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sets with elements outside of A. 
The concepts of conditioning and revision are based on 
this idea. When we obtain the information that ''the 
truth'' is within some set E with certainty, all elements of E 
become impossible. The two concepts differ in their treat­
ments of sets which have a nonempty intersection with E. 
Conditioning a mass distribution m defined on Q with 
respect to a set E � Q means to neglect the evidence 
mass which is inconsistent with the new information. All 
masses not attached to subsets of E are omitted and the 
remaining masses are normalized. 
Defmition 3: Let m be a mass distribution on 7? and 
E be a subset ofil with Bel.,(E) > 0. The mass distribu­
tion 
d � m(A) if A c E 
m(. I E): 2° � [0, 1]; m(A IE) = Belm(E) -
0 otherwise 
is called conditional1 mass distribution. 
The concept of revision is directly based on the idea of 
partially movable evidence mass. All masses attached to 
subsets A of Q float to the sets A n E after revision with 
respect to the set E. 
Definition 4: Let m be a mass distribution on 7? and 
E be a subset of n with Bel.,( E) > 0. The mass distribu­
tion 
d 
j D•�•A m(D) 
miA) = Plm(E) 
0 
is called revised 2 mass distribution. 
if A� 0 
otherwise 
Contrary to conditioning revision does not omit the evi­
dence mass attached to sets lying just partially in E. Revi­
sing m on E yields the belief function 
Belm(A U B) - Belm(B) 
Bel (A) = , A � Q m, 1 - Belm(B) 
and the plausibility function 
PI (A) = 
Plm(A n B) • 
A � Q. m, Plm(B) 
Remembering our idea of experts or sensors choosing 
11bis concept is also called strong conditioning (Dubois and 
Prade 1986a) or geometric conditioning. 
2 This concept is also know as Dempster's rule of cond itioning 
(Shafer 1976). 
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subsets of n the differences between the two concepts 
conditioning and revision can be made clear quite easily. 
Conditioning is a very strict treatment of experts whose 
valuations are inconsistent with the new information E. 
These experts are now considered as totally unreliable and 
the evidence mass distributed due to their statements has 
to be redistributed under the subsets A c;;; E chosen by the 
reliable experts. 
Revision induces a more optimistic treatment of the ex­
perts. The idea is that the valuations which are only parti­
ally inconsistent with the new information (A IZ: E but 
A n E * 0) are now treated as if the expert meant A n E 
and not A. The expert just was not able to express this 
situation because he had not enough information. So he is 
still considered to be reliable and the evidence mass atta­
ched to A flows completely to the intersection with E. 
Only those experts whose valuations are totally inconsi­
stent with E are treated as in the case of conditioning. 
3 THE CONCEPT OF SPECIALIZATION 
In order to compare different frames of discermnent we 
introduce the notion of a refinement (Shafer 1976). 
Definition 5: A set Q' is a refinement of n if there is 
a mapping fi : 2° -t 2°' such that 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
fi({x}) * 0 for all X E Q, 
fi({x}) n fi({x1}) "' 0, if X #- X1, 
U { fi({x}) I x e n } "' n' and 
fi(A) "' u { n({x}) I X E A }. 
fi is called a refmement mapping. If such a mapping 
exists, the sets n and Q' are compatible, where the refi­
ned space Q' is able to carry more information than its 
quotient space Q. In order to decide for each ro E Q 
whether information concerning some set A' c;;; Q' may be 
of relevance for the valuation of ro or not we define the 
mapping II. 
Definition 6: Let Q' be a refinement of n where 
fi : 2° -t 2°' is the respective refinement mapping. The 
mapping 
II : 2a -t 2°, II(A1 4 {roE n I tr({ro}) n A'* d 
is called the outer reduction induced by fi. 
II(A ') contains those ro e n which have one or more 
elements ro' e fi ( { ro}) within A'. Note that II essentially 
is a projection that attaches to each element ro' e n that 
element ro with ro' e fi ( { ro }). The projection of a mass 
distribution m' defined on 2°' can be obtained by 
IT(m') : 2° -t [0, 1); II(m')(A) 4 L m1(A '). 
A'� 0': 
n(A�·A 
If there is a mass distribution m' defined on 2°' and a 
projection II(m') of m' on�. then m' is a refinement of 
IT(m'). The formulation of a mass distribution m on n in 
terms of the refmed space n· is defined by 
fi(m) : 2a -t [0, 1); 
fi(m)(A') g,l m(A), if A1 "'. IT(A), 0 otherwzse 
and is denoted as the vacuous extension of m. From the 
definition it is obvious, that each vacuous extension of a 
mass distribution is its refinement. In contrast to the pro­
jection which generally means a loss of information, the 
vacuous extension preserves the information borne by the 
original mass distribution. 
The main issue of this chapter is to define the concept of 
specialization. The intuitive idea of a specialization is the 
projection of a revision. 
Definition 7: Let s, t be two mass distributions defined 
on 2°. We call s a specialization of t (s 1:: t), if and only 
if there are two mass distributions s' and t' on a refine­
ment Q' of n where s' and t' are refinements of s and t, 
respectively, and if there is an event E' c;;; Q' such that 
s'(B') = t�.(B') 
holds for each B' c;;; Q'. 
This definition tells us that we will get all specializations 
of a given mass distribution on n by considering all pos­
sible revisions in a refined space n'. Relating now the 
concept of specialization with Dempster's rule of combi­
nation we can see, that specialization is bound to the idea 
of updating and not to aggregation. Dempster's rule com­
bines two mass distributions (basic probability assign­
ments) which are defined on the same sample space but 
based on different bodies of evidence. This is a concept of 
aggregating different expert views. 
The change from a mass distribution m to a specialization 
of m is a different concept, and it is due to an updating of 
the refinement of m in a refinement of the sample space 
n. We use revision as the updating rule which causes a 
change of data in the refined space. Those observations A 
of the experts which are not completely covered by the 
new evidence E are changed to become A n E instead 
without loosing any evidence mass. 
In addition to the definition above the following theorem 
gives two equivalent characterizations of the specialization 
relationship. The first one allows to check easily whether 
s c: t is valid or not. The second one reflects our intuitive 
idea of floating evidence masses describing the flow of 
the mass t(A) onto the subsets of A. 
Theorem 1: Let s, t be two mass distributions on n. The 
following three statements are equivalent: 
(i) s 1:: t, 
(ii) \;fA \::: n : ( Q,(A) � 0 => Q,(A) � 0 ). 
(iii) For every A \::: n there are functions 
hA : 2° � [0, 1] such that 
a) E hiB) � t(A), 
B:Bc. 0 
b) hA(B) -F 0 => B \::: A, for all B \::: n, and 
E hiB) 
c) s(B) 
� 
A'A" 0 for all 0 -FB \::: n. 
- E hi0) 
A:Ao;; 0 
hi B) specifies that amount of "belief' comitted to A that 
in the course of refining m to m' floats to the set B. Con­
dition (iii.a) of Theorem 1 assures that no evidence mass 
is lost, condition (iii. b) requires that the masses flow only 
to subsets. Those masses floating to the empty set repre­
sent partial contradictions, thus have to be neglected and 
the remaining portions have to be normalized as pointed 
out in condition (iii.c). 
The normalization in condition (iii.c) is due to our treat­
ment of experts whose observations are totally inconsi­
stent with the new evidence (see sect. 2). They are now 
considered to be unreliable and so the evidence mass 
bound to their observations has to be redistributed under 
the consistent observations. Note that we also use a closed 
world assumption. Smets (Smets 1988) considers an open 
world assumption and allows the empty set to bear evi­
dence mass. In this case there is no normalization of the 
remaining masses because the evidence mass on the emp­
ty set is supposed to indicate the belief that the actual 
state of the world cannot be represented in the chosen 
frame of discernment. Our perception of the empty set is 
a different one. The evidence mass that flows to the emp­
ty set indicates from our point of view the inconsistency 
of expert observations at the beginning of the updating 
process and is not characterizing the current situation. So 
a normalization has to be made because we don't want to 
weaken the belief in the consistent observations. Using an 
open world assumption means that an expert cannot be 
wrong in spite of inconsistencies due to new information. 
From our point of view inconsistency arises because of 
Reasoning with Mass Distributions 185 
errors made by some of the experts. 
A similar concept to the specialization relation is the idea 
of a containment of "bodies of evidence" introduced in 
(Yager 1986). A body of evidence is a pair (F,m), where 
m is a mass distribution defined on n and F contains the 
focal elements of m. A definition of "strong inclusion" 
can be found in (Dubois and Prade 1986b): 
(F,m) -< (F',m') if and only if 
(I) \;f B E F, 3 A' E F1, B \::: A1 
(ii) \;f A1 E F1, 3 B E F, B \::: A1 
(iii) There exist W8A, E [0, 1 ], for all B, A' such that 
WBA' > 0 => B \:::A', E WBA' � 1, and 
A'.B 
\;f B E F, m(B) � E WBA' , 
A':B C. A1 
\;f A' E F', m'(A ') � E WBA' . 
B:Bc.A' 
Specialization is more general than strong inclusion. We 
have (F,m) -< (F', m') => m c: m' but not vice versa. The 
W8A. are identical to the values hA.(B), but there is no 
normalization. From considering the definition above and 
our idea of floating evidence masses, it is obvious that in 
the case of strong inclusion there is no mass flow to the 
empty set and that no mass is lost (LWBA' = 1), so a nor­
malization is not necessary. 
4 SPECIALIZATION MATRICES 
In order to compute a specialization of a mass distribution 
m we characterize m as a vector and the respective specia­
lization-relation by a matrix V : 2° x 2° � [0, 1] and 
obtain the more specific mass distribution m' by "multi­
plying" the vector m with the matrix V. In the following 
we use square brackets to indicate that we conceive the 
respective functions as vectors or matrices. 
Definition 8: Let !l be the frame of discernment. 
(i) A matrix V: 2° x 2° � [0, I] is called a speciali­
zation matrix, if and only if 
(a) E V[A,B] � 1 for all A \::: n 
B:Bc. 0 
(b) B ¢ A => V[A,B] � 0. 
(ii) Let V be a specialization matrix and let m be a mass 
distribution on 2°. If 
c g, E E m[A] • V[A,B] > 0 
A:A:r;; 0 8:8�0 
then the mass distribution m 0 V is defined by 
186 Kruse, Nauck, and Klawonn 
d �2. · L m[A] · V[A,B] if B "- 0 
(m 0 V)[B] "' ' A'A" o 
for all B,;;; Q. 
0 otherwise 
In contrast to the mass flow functions hA, A ,;;; Q, specia­
lization matrices do not assign absolute portions but rela­
tive amounts of mass. 
Theorem 2: Let m and m' be two mass distributions 
defined on2°. We have 
m' �;;: m <=? 3V: m' = m 0 V, 
where V is a specialization matrix. 
The processes of conditioning and revision, i.e. the change 
from a mass distribution m to the conditional mass dis­
tribution m( ·I E) or to the revised mass distribution mE 
respectively, are special cases of specialization and can 
therefore be described by special specialization matrices. 
Recall that conditioning with respect to the set E ,;;; Q 
means that those masses bound to sets A ,;;; E remain 
where they are, while those bound to sets A a; E have to 
be neglected. 
Definition 9: Let Q be the frame of discernment and 
let E ,;;; Q be a nrn-empty set. The conditional matrix 
C(E) : 2° x 2° � [0, I] is defined by 
ll ifA�tE and B=0 
C(E )[A,B] g l if A ,;;; E and B "' A 
0 otherwise 
We obtain m( · IE) = m 0 C(E). 
Revision with respect to the set E means that the masses 
attached to sets A "-0 float to A n E. Masses attached to 
sets with A n E = 0 have to be neglected since they 
represent (partial) contradictions of the information E and 
the mass distribution m. 
Definition 10: Let Q be the frame of discernment and 
let E ,;;; Q be a non-empty set. The revision matrix R(E) : 
2° x 2° � [0, l] is defined by 
R(E )[A,B] g { o
l if B "'An E 
otherwise 
We obtain mE = m 0 R(E). 
The use of specialization matrices leads to a new inter­
esting concept. Some specialization matrix V represents a 
piece of "structural knowledge". Multiplying a mass 
distribution m with V means to split the evidence masses 
in the light of knowledge encoded by V. A rather strict 
requirement is that the "application" of V to a more 
specific mass distribution m' should yield a more specific 
result. 
Definition 11: Let V: 2° x 2° � [0, l] be a speciali­
zation matrix. V is called monotonic, if and only if 
s�;;t � s0V�;;t0V 
holds for all mass distribution s, t : 2° � [0, 1]. 
The next theorem provides a simple possibility to check 
whether a given specialization matrix is monotonic or not. 
It relies on a test, if there is no such set A whose mass 
flow is completely "outrun" by one of its supersets mass 
flow. 
Theorem 3: Let V: 2° x 2° � [0, l] be a speciali­
zation matrix. V is monotonic, if and only if for all sets A, 
B ,;;; Q with V[A,B] > 0, and for all C ::2 A there is a set 
D ::2 B with V[C,D] > 0. 
Theorem 4: Let s,t be two mass distributions defined 
on 2° and s �;;: t. Then there is always a specialization 
matrix V : 2° x 2° � [0, l] and V is monotonic, such 
that s = t 0 v. 
We want to show in the sequel that also aspects of non­
monotonic reasoning can be handled with specialization 
matrices. From Theorem 3 it is clear that a specialization 
matrix V is non-monotonic, if there exist sets B � A � C 
such that there is a mass flow from A to B and no mass 
flow from C to supersets of B. 
First we want to compare non-monotonic specialization 
matrices with Yager's non-monotonic compatibility rela­
tions (Yager 1988). Yager defines a (type ID compatibility 
relation on two sets X and Y as a relation R on 2x· x Y 
such that for each T E 2x· there exists at least one y E Y 
such that (T,y) E R, where 2X' is the power set of X minus 
the empty set. R(T,y) implies that (x,y), for all x E T, are 
possible states of the world. 
Let W = {yl R(T,y)} be the subset of Y that contains the 
y E Y which are related to any x E T. W is called the 
"associated set" in Y of T, denoted T � W. A compatibi­
lity relation R is called "irregular" if there exists a triple 
TI � WI, T2 � W2 and T3 � W3 with T3 = TI u T2 such 
that W3 is strictly contained in WI u W2, W3 c WI u W2. 
Yager has proven that every irregular (type II) compati­
bility relation is non-montonic. That means if we have 
two mass distributions s, t and we have s -< t (strong 
inclusion) this does not imply s o R -< t o R. 
Because the concept of specialization matrices is more 
general than compatibility relations, a non-monotonic 
compatibility relation R can be easily expressed with a 
non-monotonic specialization matrix. Let S be a subset of 
X x Y, let D5 "' {x I 3 y, (x,y) E S, R (x, y) } , and let 
W 0 be the associated set of D5. A (type II) compatibility 
' 
relation R can be expressed with a specialization matrix 
VR: 2XxY X 2XxY with 
v [S S'] = l l ,  if S' = s n {Ds X wD,l R ' 0, otherwise 
If the relation R is non-monotonic, the same is true for 
the specialization matrix V R- If we express any (type II) 
compatibility relation R with a specialization matrix V R> 
and VR is non-monotonic, the same holds for R. 
Now let us take a look at the well known example of the 
bird Tweety who is not able to fly because he is a pen­
guin. Let n = nl X n2 be our frame of discememt where 
01 = {birds, fish} and 02 = (fly, not fly}. Now the rule 
"All birds fly" can be expressed by a specialization 
matrix V with 
V[A,B] g, l l if B = A - {(birds, not fly)} 
0 otherwise 
The rule "Penguins don't fly" can only be represented in 
a refined space, e.g. Q' = 01' x 02, where 01' ={eagles, 
penguins, fish}. In our refined space the two (partially 
contradicting) rules "All birds fly" and "Penguins don't 
fly" are expressed by the following specialization matrix 
v·. 
V'[A,B] 4 
if A ;:;2 !eagles, penguins) x !not fly) 
:= H and B = A - H, 
if (penguins, fly) E A and B 
= A - {(penguinsJly)}, 
l if A :tl H and (penguins, fly) � A, 
0 otherwise 
The two rules force the mass attached to the set C = 
{eagles, penguins} x (fly, not fly} to float to the set D = 
{eagles, penguins} x (fly} and the masses attached to A 
= {penguins} x (fly, not fly} to B = (penguin} x {not 
fly}. We have C ;:;2 A but D :tl B. That means the speciali­
zation matrix V' is non-monotonic. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
With the calculus of mass distributions we presented a 
suitable theoretical tool for reasoning under uncertainty. 
We showed that the flow of evidence masses can be con­
veniently handled by specialization matrices. For the 
concepts of conditioning and revision (Dempster's rule of 
conditioning) there exist special specialization matrices. 
We also demonstrated that certain aspects of non-monoto­
nic reasoning, especially partially contradicting statements 
can be expressed by non-monotonic specialization matri­
ces. In cooperation with Domier GmbH the method of 
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reasoning with mass distributions was implemented on a 
TI-Explorer under KEE. 
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